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Abstract 
To date little attention has been paid to how social cognitive bias can influence how 
financial advisors interpret and respond to the needs of millionaire investors, and if this varies 
depending on the gender of the investor. This research investigates whether experienced 
professional financial advisors who work with millionaire investors make different 
attributions for the control and knowledge that investors have of their investments, and if they 
make different investment portfolio recommendations to equivalent male and female 
investors. Using methodology novel to finance, this vignette-based study that controls for 
gender finds evidence that professional financial advisors judge millionaire female investors 
to have less control over their investment portfolios relative to men. Empirical results also 
show that female advisors judge women to be less knowledgeable about investments than 
men. Despite such perceptual differences, advisors recommend equally risky portfolios to 
male and female investors. These results have implications for wealth management 
institutions and the monitoring of financial advisors for millionaire individuals. 
 
JEL Classification: G11, G12. 
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1. Introduction 
A growing literature in behavioural finance shows that investors rely on their own 
perceptions and intuitive beliefs when making investment decisions, rather than selecting 
efficient portfolios that optimally balance risk and reward (Benartzi and Thaler 2001; 
Kahneman 2003). However, a large proportion of millionaires do not make investment 
decisions themselves, but rely instead on advice provided by financial advisors. As such, 
these investment decisions also depend on the judgements that advisors make about the needs 
and preferences of their clients (i.e., the investors). To date, very little research has 
considered how advisors judge the needs of their clients, or indeed the role that social 
cognition plays in the way that advisors make sense of their clients’ needs. More specifically, 
there has been little consideration of how social cognitive bias may differentially impact how 
advisors interpret and make sense of the needs and preferences of different groups (e.g., male 
and female investors), and how this in turn influences advisors’ portfolio recommendations. 
This paper addresses this notable lacuna in existing research by drawing on attribution 
theory from social psychology (Harvey et al. 2014), and by utilising vignette methodology to 
investigate whether practising professional financial advisors explain and respond to the 
needs and preferences of male and female millionaire investors differently. Vignettes, (i.e., 
pen-portraits of fictional millionaire investors), are used to ascertain the judgements that 
advisors make aboutthe investment knowledge, control and risk tolerance of potential clients. 
This methodology, which is frequently used in social psychology yet novel to finance, is 
effective in extracting attitudes and judgements in quantitative research (Schoenberg and 
Ravdal 2000). In this study, the vignettes allow for a clean experiment where each of the ten 
vignettes explicitly defines a client and provides the same information to advisors who rate 
the vignettes.  
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 By introducing attribution theory to behavioural finance, and asking financial 
advisors working with millionaire investors to complete an innovative vignette based survey, 
it is possible to investigate whether advisors judge the needs of male and female fictional 
millionaire investors, with the same characteristics and circumstances, in the same manner or 
whether they exhibit a bias. The study tests the hypotheses that social cognitive bias leads 
experienced advisors who work with millionaire investors to (a) perceive female investors as 
having less knowledge and control over their investments than men, and (b) to recommend 
comparatively less risky investment portfolios to women.  
The study makes several contributions to the behavioural finance literature. Firstly, it 
draws on attribution theory to provide a basis for predicting and studying the potential for 
social cognitive bias in interpersonal decision-making. While this theory has received 
extensive study in other fields of psychology and social judgement, it has yet to be fully 
explored in the context of financial advice. Secondly, the research design introduces a new 
and innovative methodology (i.e., vignettes), which provides a tried and tested method to 
investigate gender and other group differences in the way that financial advisors support and 
advise clients. Thirdly, the study investigates the judgements of individuals who work as 
financial advisors and have many years of experience advising millionaire clients. As such it 
extends existing research beyond laboratory based studies and considers the judgements of 
experts rather than novices. Finally, the research is important because it focuses on a specific 
need, namely the importance of providing appropriate and valid advice to millionaire female 
investors, a group that is growing significantly in size, yet for whom advice is often perceived 
as unsatisfactory (Friedland 2013). 
 
1.1 Millionaire Investors 
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According to the World Wealth Report (2013), high net worth, or ‘millionaire’ 
investors are defined as individuals who hold at least US$1million, or the equivalent, in 
financial or investable assets. Millionaires play an important investment role in the global 
economy. For example, in the UK, millionaires own 46% of the household wealth, and the 
UK has the third highest number of millionaires globally (Credit Suisse 2016).  In 2015, 
when the data for this study were collected, 961,000 UK households had assets worth over 
US$1m excluding property and luxury goods; a 12.4% increase from the previous year 
(Boston Consulting Group 2016). There are also approximately 40 financial institutions in the 
UK that provide support for these individuals and manage in excess of US$50 million each 
(A.T. Kearney 2013).  
Among the wealthy, female wealth growth has outpaced that of men. The Telegraph 
reported that women aged between 22-29 years are earning more than men (Fraser 2015), and 
by 2020 it is predicted that women will make up 53% of all UK millionaires (Centre for 
Economics and Business Research 2013). Women's economic empowerment therefore 
represents a major social change (The Economist December 30, 2009). Yet, despite this 
apparent financial success, there is evidence that women remain disadvantaged relative to 
men in terms of their investments. For example, while women have a longer life expectancy 
than men (83 compared to 79 years: World Health Organization 2016), they are less likely 
than men to have a pension plan (Hung and Yoong 2010), and those women who do have a 
pension plan have built up a smaller amount typically due to a higher prevalence of part-time 
work and taking time out for family care. Moreover, women have been shown to have a 
lower allocation to risky assets in their retirement savings (Sundén and Surette 1998). 
Interestingly there is also evidence from recent studies that indicates women are more likely 
to be dissatisfied with their financial advisors compared to men, and typically perceive 
financial advising to be a male orientated activity (Friedland 2013). These findings have 
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prompted many investment organisations to question what more they can do to better 
understand and support the needs of wealthy women, and ultimately to attract and retain this 
important client group.  
However, one area that has received relatively little attention from finance researchers 
to date, concerns the way in which advisors interpret and explain client needs, and how this 
can be influenced by unconscious stereotypical assumptions or group bias. For example, 
studies investigating social cognition in other work contexts have found that people are 
routinely and often unconsciously biased in the way they perceive others, including making 
different causal judgments about the needs and behaviour of men and women (Deaux and 
Major 1987; Feather and Simon 1975).   This study builds on existing work by drawing on 
attribution theory to investigate whether financial advisors interpret the needs of equivalent 
male and female millionaire investors differently, and whether these differences affect the 
portfolio recommendations they make. 
 
2. Background on Advising Investors: Attribution Theory 
By introducing cognitive psychology to the traditional rational agent model, Tversky 
and Kahneman (1986) demonstrated robust and consistent evidence of irrational decision 
making behaviour among investors previously unexplained by traditional rational economic 
theory. They argued that the rational economic theory had been “conceived as a normative 
model of an idealised decision maker, not as a description of the behaviour of real people” 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1986, 251). In doing so attention shifted to the subjective and 
sometimes irrational biases that influence decisions. Behavioural finance researchers have 
been particularly interested in the impact of psychological bias on investor decision-making 
(Muradoglu and Harvey 2012) and how different biases illustrate errors that investors make 
as they allow irrational behaviour into their decision making process. Kahneman (2003) 
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describes these as emotional brain filters that allow emotions to manipulate decision making. 
Loewenstein et al. (2001) suggest that risk attitudes are emotional expressions, rather than 
rational evaluations, with situational complexity and uncertainty likely to increase the 
influence of emotions (Forgas 1995).  
While behavioural finance adds complexity to traditional models that explain optimal, 
but not actual, decision making behaviour (Nofsinger 2005), its focus has tended to remain 
on decisions about investments rather than decisions about investors. For example, studies 
have explored the influence of self-attribution bias on investor decisions; researchers have 
shown that individuals are consistently more likely to attribute positive outcomes (e.g., 
successful investment) to self and negative outcomes (e.g., unsuccessful investment) to 
external causes, making it difficult for investors to learn from their mistakes (Hoffmann and 
Post 2014) and improve their investment outcomes. Mittal (2010) found evidence that 
investors differ in the extent to which they demonstrate this self-attribution bias, and that 
investors showing high levels of bias are more likely to believe that they have both superior 
knowledge relative to others and a belief that they can outperform the market (Barber and 
Odean 1999). Those investors who are prone to the self-attribution bias have a tendency to 
realise gains too quickly and to hold on to underperforming investments (Feng and Seasholes 
2005). Overconfident investors also attach importance to past return experiences to reinforce 
their convictions (Hoffmann and Post 2016) leading them to trade too much, generating 
higher transaction costs and ultimately lower returns (Hoffmann and Post 2016; Odean 1999).  
As yet very little behavioural finance research has considered interpersonal 
attributional bias in situations where one individual (i.e., a professional financial advisor) 
gives investment advice to another (i.e., a client). These situations require the advisor to 
interpret the client’s needs, and to make a recommendation about how he or she should invest 
their wealth on the basis of these interpretations. In these situations, interpersonal and inter-
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group attributional bias have been shown to influence the way in which observers interpret 
and respond to the behaviour and needs of others (Kelley 1973; Martinko and Thomason 
1998). 
 
2.1 Delegated Portfolio Management 
Unlike self-managed wealth, wealth managed through financial advisors involves 
joint decision making within an agency relationship. This is defined by Ross (1973, 134) as a 
“relationship... between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on 
behalf of, or as representative for the other, in a particular domain of decision problems”.  
In this study, the principal (i.e., the investor) delegates some decision making 
authority to the agent (Jensen and Meckling 1976) by appointing them as their investment 
portfolio advisor responsible for providing them with information and investment advice 
(Bhattacharya and Peiderer 1985). In the UK, the activities of financial advisors are regulated 
by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in order to protect investors and ensure fair 
treatment. Importantly, in situations where investors engage a professional financial advisor, 
investment decisions are not made in isolation, but rather in conversation with the advisor. 
He or she can then influence the decision making process by providing information and 
advice about different investment possibilities, depending on their understanding of the 
investor's need. .  
Yet, like investors, professional advisors can be vulnerable to cognitive bias (De 
Bondt 1998; Chalmers and Reuter 2010; Karabulut 2011) and may also fail to correct the 
biases an investor may have (Mullainathan, Noeth and Schoar 2012). It is therefore possible 
that advisors’ judgements about clients, and any recommendations they make, will be 
influenced by the stereotypes and assumptions they have about investors' needs, based on 
investor characteristics such as gender.  
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2.2 Gender differences 
Gender differences are of particular interest to wealth management institutions and 
regulators due to the rapid growth in female wealth and the resultant economic impact of 
investment decisions made by women. Differences in the investment behaviour between men 
and women are well documented. Previous research has found that women invest less, trade 
less frequently and select lower risk investments in their portfolios, and with a smaller 
allocation into risky assets, it is argued that women are more risk averse Charness and 
Gneezy (2012) and Koedijk, Pownall, and Statman (2015). Studies show that women also 
tend to perceive themselves as less confident in making investment decisions (Estes and 
Hosseini 1988; Barber and Odean 2001), and are generally and historically less financially 
literate than men (Campbell 2006; Lusardi and Mitchell 2007). Dwyer, Gilkeson and List 
(2002) find that this lower financial literacy translates into women making lower risk 
investment decisions. Agnew et al. (2008) report a similar link between lower financial 
literacy, confidence and increased risk aversion, with 38% of women in their study opting for 
a less risky annuity retirement option compared to 29% of men. These findings provide 
further support for Sundén and Surette’s (1998) assertion that women make less risky 
retirement asset allocation choices than men. 
However, extant research has generally focused on identifying differences between 
the preferences and styles of male and female investors, with women typically perceiving 
themselves to be less knowledgeable about investing, less confident when making investment 
decisions and more likely to demonstrate a lower risk tolerance which translates into a desire 
for lower risk investments decisions compared to men (Barber and Odean 2001, 2002; 
Croson and Gneezy 2009; Hira and Loibl 2008). Yet to date there has been no attempt to 
investigate whether such differences might arise because women receive different investment 
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advice based on advisors’ assumptions about their risk tolerance. For example, while many 
wealthy women engage professional advisors to guide them through the investment decision 
making process, less is known about whether the risk tolerance of female and male investors 
is perceived differently by professional financial advisors. 
Evidence that such differences may exist can be found in research concerned with 
attribution theory, which considers the everyday causal explanations that people make both 
for their own behaviours and the behaviour of others (Harvey et al. 2014; Heider 1958; 
Weiner 1985; Wong and Weiner 1981), which in turn influence future decisions and actions 
(Fincham and Jaspars 1979; Martinko and Thomason 1998). Attribution theorists have 
studied the impact that perceptions, biases and stereotypes have on behaviour, particularly in 
relation to their impact on differential decision-making for men and women (Silvester and 
Koczwara 2012). For example, in work psychology, attributional rationalisation is the 
tendency for managers to attribute successful performance by women to unstable and 
circumstantial causes (e.g., effort and luck) and equivalent male performance to internal and 
stable causes (e.g., ability) as a result of in-group/out-group bias (Heilman, Block, and 
Martell 1995; Swim and Sanna 1996). There is now considerable evidence that observers 
make different judgements depending on the gender of the observed, with female success 
more typically attributed to luck (Deaux and Emswiller 1974; Feather and Simon 1975). In 
the workplace, Silvester and Koczwara (2012) found that senior managers attributed the 
success of female junior managers to more external and temporary causes like the actions of 
others, while they attributed success on the part of junior male managers to more internal 
controllable and stable causes like talent and ability. In general, observers tend to judge men 
to have more control or confidence over their actions than women (Weiner et al. 1971). 
To date, however, no research has considered this bias in the context of investment 
advice; nor to whether it might lead advisors to perceive the needs of wealthy male and 
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female investors differently, and thus to provision of different types of investment advice. 
Yet circumstantial evidence exists to support this proposition, for example, a study of 
undergraduate students by Daruvala (2007) found that both male and female observers, (i.e., 
the students in the sample), judged women to be more risk-averse than men. Likewise, in a 
study conducted in the financial services industry, Wang (1994) found that brokers providing 
investment advice to individuals with US$25,000 to invest, allocated less time and 
recommended less risky investments to women relative to men.  
The existence of biased social perception is likely to be particularly important for 
wealthy investors who rely on advisors who make investment recommendations on their 
behalf. Yet, existing research focuses on how professional advisors are prone to behavioural 
biases when making investment decisions, rather than whether the perception that advisors 
have of different investors is biased. Moreover, the few studies that do consider advisors’ 
perceptions look at their how they perceive affluent investors (Wang 1994) or students 
(Daruvala 2007), and not millionaire investors. Therefore, investigating the judgements that 
advisors make about wealthy female and male investors provides an important addition to 
current understanding of potential gender differences in the way investment 
recommendations are made.  
By drawing on attribution theory to examine the assertion that gender differences in 
investor preference may be in part perceptual and influenced by advisor bias, the present 
study makes four contributions to existing knowledge. First, it explores differences in the 
attributions made by financial advisors for male and female investors and the impact these 
may have on investment recommendations. Secondly, the study utilises a novel methodology, 
namely a vignette survey that enables attributions for male and female investors to be elicited 
in a controlled and standardised way. Thirdly, it introduces the new demographic of 
millionaire investors, a ‘hard to reach’ group rarely considered in previous studies. Fourthly, 
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the study obtains ratings from experienced financial advisors whose clients are predominantly 
millionaires. 
 
 2.3 Hypotheses 
Drawing on behavioural finance research that finds that female investors tend to rate 
themselves as less knowledgeable, less confident and more risk averse relative to male 
investors, and attribution research which finds differences in the way that the behaviour of 
men and women is explained by others, this study tests whether a similar bias may apply to 
how financial advisors perceive the relative knowledge, control and risk tolerance of male 
and female millionaire investors. We hypothesise that, in situations where all other 
characteristics and investment circumstances are held equal: 
Hypothesis 1: Financial advisors will rate female millionaire investors to be less 
knowledgeable about investments than male millionaire investors. 
Hypothesis 2: Financial advisors will perceive female millionaire investors to have 
less control over their investments than male millionaire investors.  
Hypothesis 3: Financial advisors will allocate lower risk portfolios to female 
millionaire investors relative to male millionaire investors. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Context and Participants 
This study introduces new methodology into behavioural finance through the use of 
vignettes to elicit attributions from financial advisors about male and female millionaire 
investors under controlled conditions. The vignette experiment was conducted in the UK 
private banking sector. The UK is of particular interest due to its high proportion of 
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millionaire investors and its prominence globally in the wealth management sector. This 
sector continues to grow, both in terms of total wealth under management, and specifically 
the growth in female wealth. Additionally, changes in the regulatory environment following 
the credit crisis has increased the focus that the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) places on 
advisors’ behaviour towards their clients, adding to the study’s face validity.  
Data were collected directly from financial advisors, employed by private banks and 
other wealth management firms in the UK, who are working with millionaire individual 
investors (i.e., those with more than US$1 million or equivalent to invest). This unique data 
set was accessible due to the first researcher’s extensive insight into the sector obtained 
through nearly twenty years of working in the industry. In the UK advisors are regulated by 
the FCA through their employer. The FCA requires that all advisors undertake investment 
and portfolio construction qualifications to ensure they understand how to risk profile 
investors, and are therefore able to recommend suitable investment portfolios with an asset 
allocation appropriate to each risk profile. This training also ensures that, before providing 
any advice, an advisor must first establish which investments are suitable for a particular 
client using pre-designed investment questionnaires. These questionnaires are designed to 
meet regulatory requirements by evidencing suitable investment recommendations for clients 
(Estrada 2016); categorising investors' risk profiles using information about their personal 
circumstances, such as age, amount of wealth, source of wealth, goals, marital status, 
dependents, expenditure, profession, investment experience. Although risk profiles may vary 
depending on the institution, they typically range from 1 (risk averse) to 5 (aggressive), with 
each rating associated with a recommended target asset allocation or investment portfolio. 
For example, institutions may create model investment portfolios for each level of investor 
risk classification depending on the investor’s personal characteristics which set the boundary 
as to which investments are suitable for each investor. Although the FCA does not determine 
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the metrics used by institutions it overseas the suitability process for assessing the risk 
investors are prepared to take (Financial Services Authority 2011)
4
.  
Although individual advisors are responsible for providing suitable investment 
advice, they can also influence this initial determination of the client's risk profile, thereby 
adding further opportunity for subjectivity. Importantly, advisors’ judgements of investors 
are critical for determining what investments can be offered. The industry and the financial 
regulator expect that advisors rationally follow these sorts of metrics, but as yet relatively 
little attention has been paid to the possibility that advisors are influenced by other client 
characteristics, like gender, that ought not to affect portfolio recommendations.  
 
3.2 Development of Vignette Questionnaire 
This study utilises a vignette based questionnaire to collect ratings for hypothetical 
millionaire investors that respondents might typically encounter in their work. Although 
vignette methodology has a long history in psychological and sociological research, it is not 
common in the finance literature. Atzmüller and Steiner (2010: 128) define a vignette as “a 
short, carefully constructed description of a person, object, or situation, representing a 
systematic combination of characteristics”. Vignettes are often used as part of a questionnaire 
in order to allow researchers to capture ratings for standardised scenarios from multiple 
respondents. By asking questions on decision-making following a brief hypothetical scenario, 
vignette methodology combines a traditional survey with an experiment and is particularly 
suited to eliciting attitudes and judgements in quantitative research (Schoenberg and Ravdal 
2000).  
In this study ten vignettes were developed; each was approximately 100 words in 
length and described a different fictional millionaire investor. Care was given to making sure 
                                                     
4 The Financial Services Authority underwent a name change to the Financial Conduct Authority in April 2013. 
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that the narratives were realistic, and that each vignette included sufficient detail and 
contextual factors to ensure face validity, verified by professional financial advisors 
consulted during the development phase. For example, every vignette contained information 
about the investor that an advisor might expect to know soon after being introduced to a new 
client and would enable them to make judgements about their investment needs. The same 
categories of variables were included in each vignette (e.g., age, profession, wealth), but 
varied to increase the credibility and range of likely investors. 
In order to compare the effects of investor gender, two versions of each vignette were 
created: one where the investor was male and one where they were female. Thus, gender was 
allowed to vary while keeping all other details constant. Table 1 shows examples of two 
vignettes illustrating the changes made for male and female versions. For example, the first 
vignette in Table 1 is a 36 year old IT consultant with £800,000 in liquid wealth and a 
property portfolio. Half of the respondents will rate this vignette as Susan (i.e., a woman) and 
half the respondents as Michael (i.e., a man). The second vignette portrays another fictional 
client, namely a 59 year old CEO called Nick or Anna. The methodology enables advisors to 
rate different types of fictional clients in a clean experiment where only gender is altered.  
__________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________ 
In order to ensure that both a female and a male version of each vignette were rated, 
two versions of the survey (i.e., survey A and survey B) were created. In both versions the 
vignettes are presented in the same order, but in version A, even-numbered vignettes describe 
male investors and odd numbered vignettes describe female investors, while in version B 
even-numbered vignettes are female and odd-numbered vignettes are male. This approach 
follows the methodology pioneered by Schein (1976, Schein et al. 1996), and allows the 
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gender of the hypothetical millionaire client in each vignette to vary, while controlling for 
other individual and situational factors. 
After reading each vignette, study participants were asked to respond to three 
questions: firstly, `On a scale from 1–10 how knowledgeable would you rate this client to be 
about investments?' (where 1 = not at all knowledgeable, 10 = extremely knowledgeable), 
secondly `Relative to the average investor, how much control do you think this client is likely 
to have over their investments?' (where 1 = a lot less than the average investor and 5 = a lot 
more than the average investor).  
Thirdly, respondents were presented with seven investment portfolios that varied 
according to risk and asked: ‘Which of the following portfolios would you recommend to this 
client?’ In order to enable a controlled measure of risk, seven investment portfolios were 
constructed using varied asset allocations, to reflect differing levels of risk ranging from 1 
(very low) to 7 (very high). This approach is consistent with Modern Portfolio Theory 
(MPT), where investors select a portfolio that balances likely risk and reward (Wilford 2012), 
and follows methodology used in previous research by De Bondt (1998) and Karabulut 
(2010). Each portfolio includes a mix of investments, including stocks, bonds and other 
assets (Marston 2011). Table 2 shows the asset allocation of the seven portfolios.  
__________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________ 
In each of the seven portfolios the asset mix is varied to represent different risk, and asset 
volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the return distribution of the portfolios. For 
example, Portfolio 1 contains 51% bonds and 19% equities, while Portfolio 7 contains 3% 
bonds and 86% equities. Portfolio 1 has the lowest risk (as measured by the standard 
deviation of the empirical distribution) and portfolio seven the highest risk, with a gradual 
increase in the ratio of risky assets (1) to higher-risk assets (7). These portfolios mirror the 
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standard approach taken to match investor risk tolerance by allocating them to one of five or 
more risk profiles, and matching them with suitable portfolios with varied asset allocation. 
The asset allocation in the portfolios is derived from the FTSE Wealth Management 
Association Private Investor Indices (portfolios), regarded as benchmark portfolios for the 
wealth management industry in the UK and thus familiar to advisors (The Wealth 
Management Association 2015). Finally, biographical questions were included in the 
questionnaire, asking respondents to indicate their gender, age and the number of years they 
had worked as a financial advisor. 
The questionnaire was piloted with three financial advisors and three investment 
specialists, who each provided feedback on the vignettes, questions, and the portfolio 
composition. This process ensured that the questions were easy to understand, and that the 
advisors were able to correctly infer that portfolio risk increased incrementally between 
portfolios 1 to 7, without the standard deviation being disclosed to respondents. It also 
provided confirmation that the vignettes were believable and realistic (Rahman 1996) in their 
depiction of credible millionaire clients (Finch 1987). Feedback provided during piloting 
resulted in minor amendments to some questions and vignettes. The amended questionnaire 
was further tested with ten advisors who completed it online, resulting in a few additional 
minor changes to language. 
 
3.3 Procedure 
The online questionnaire was distributed randomly to over 400 professional financial 
advisors, whose responses were recorded anonymously. Consent was also sought from 
respondents to use their anonymised data as part of an academic study about investment 
advice provision that would be published. Distribution occurred in two ways. First, a major 
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UK private bank agreed to disseminate the questionnaire to all investment advisors in their 
UK offices who were working with millionaire UK clients.  Participants were invited to take 
part in the research by a senior director, and reassured that all information would be treated in 
confidence such that respondents would be anonymous to the researchers and their employer. 
This generated a total of 50 respondents (46 male and 4 female, mean age 37.9 years and 
mean experience 9.0 years). As this institution employs approximately 200 investment 
advisors, the sample represented about 25% of the population. Secondly, a snowball sampling 
methodology was utilised to secure respondents from over ten additional financial 
institutions. This involved emailing financial advisors who were known to the researchers 
and working with millionaire clients. These individuals were invited both to complete the 
questionnaire and to distribute the online questionnaire to other colleagues in similar roles. 
Again, all information was provided anonymously. This methodology generated 79 
respondents from ten UK institutions (56 male and 23 female, mean age 44.2 years and mean 
experience 14.3 years). Respondent ages ranged from 25 to 59 years for the first sample (A) 
and 27 to 67 for the second sample (B). Despite slight differences between the two samples, a 
decision was taken to treat them as a single data set for the purposes of analysis, given that 
the age range and experience of respondents in both samples were broadly similar, and the 
target group for respondents (i.e., financial advisors working with millionaire investors) is an 
exceptionally hard-to-reach group. 
Although 151 respondents began the survey,  respondents who had not rated more 
than one vignette were deemed to be not randomly missing, and therefore excluded from the 
analysis (Newman 2014). A total of 129 respondents were included in the analysis, yielding 
1147 observations in total (64 respondents completed survey A and 65 completed survey B). 
The full sample of respondents reported in Table 3 is very similar to the demographics of the 
financial advisor population as a whole reported by Hannon (2014): 79.1% of advisors in the 
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sample are male, they have a mean age of 41.74 years and an average of 12.78 years of 
experience advising wealthy clients.  
__________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________ 
 
4. Results 
In order to analyse differences between the way in which advisors perceive equivalent 
female and male investors, and how this translates into portfolio recommendations, our 
identification strategy using vignettes with gender as a treatment effect results in a simple 
approach of testing difference in means. Means were calculated and two-tailed t-tests were 
used to compare responses for knowledge rating (H1), perceived control (H2) and 
recommended risk portfolio (H3). The analysis included responses from 129 participants who 
rated the ten vignettes. Taking account of missing data this yielded a total of 1147 
observations included in the analysis. Means of ratings were computed for the overall 
responses per vignette and then split into the gender of the vignette. Significance is reported 
using P values. Additional analysis calculating means and ratings based on the gender of the 
advisor are also considered.  
The results for the full sample are presented with the summary results in table 4 
below. The overall mean computations show that advisors are on average in agreement with 
how knowledgeable the investors in the vignettes are and the portfolios that they recommend. 
However, means show that male and female vignettes are judged to have different levels of 
control over their investments. Male vignettes are attributed an average rating of 3.27 
whereas female vignettes were rated to have less control (M = 3.08), which is significant at 
the 1% level. The results for each rating are presented in more detail below.  
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__________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________ 
 
Result 1: The results for knowledge ratings (H1) are presented in more detail in table 5. Our 
analysis does not find evidence that advisors perceive women to be significantly less 
knowledgeable than men (M = 5.76 for male vignettes and M = 5.61 for female vignettes), 
therefore we reject Hypothesis 1: ‘Financial advisors will rate female millionaires less 
knowledgeable about investments than male investors who are millionaires’. Additional t-test 
analysis reveals that female respondents rate millionaires in male vignettes to be more 
knowledgeable (M=5.60) than they do millionaires in female vignettes (M= 5.22), which is 
significant at the 5% level.  
__________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________ 
 
Result 2: The control ratings yield significant differences. Overall advisors rated female 
millionaires as having less control over their investments relative to males (M = 3.27 for male 
vignettes and M = 3.08 for female vignettes. Therefore we fail to reject Hypothesis 2: 
‘Financial advisors will perceive female millionaires to have less control over their 
investments than male investors who are millionaires’. Additional analysis taking advisor 
gender into account shows that, overall, the lowest control ratings were made by female 
respondents for female millionaires (M = 2.96), whereas female respondents rated male 
millionaires to have the highest control over their investments (M = 3.27), significant at the 
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5% level. Also male advisors attribute lower control to female millionaires (M=3.11) versus 
male millionaires (M=3.27), significant at the 5% level (see table 6).  
__________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________ 
 
Result 3: T-tests revealed that when all advisors were considered together there was no 
significant difference in the type of portfolios they recommended to male and female 
millionaires (female investors M = 3.91, male investors M = 3.96). Thus hypothesis 3: 
‘Financial advisors will allocate lower risk portfolios to female millionaires relative to male 
investors who are millionaires’, was also rejected. However, inspection of the data reveals 
that the lowest risk portfolios are recommended to female investors by female advisors (M = 
3.67), relative to male investors (M = 3.97); this difference is significant at the 10% level. 
Conversely the highest risk portfolios are more likely to be recommended to male 
millionaires by male advisors (M = 3.99) and female advisors (M = 3.97). The results for the 
recommended portfolio ratings are summarised in table 7.  
__________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________ 
 
To analyse more carefully where in the distribution these differences between gender 
occur, conditional densities are drawn which condition on the gender of the financial advisor. 
These follow the non-parametric technique proposed by Racine and Li (2004), which applies 
a kernel method of density estimation to discrete variables. Density functions that show the 
differences in the degree of knowledge, control as well as the recommended portfolios are 
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shown in figures 1 – 3. Although there is a slight shift to the left for all three variables for 
female advisors, it is not significant at the 95% level.  
 
__________________________________ 
INSERT FIGURES 1, 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________ 
 
5. Discussion 
The rapid increase in the number of women millionaires in the UK, means that the 
way in which these women invest their wealth is of social and economic interest. It is also of 
particular interest to wealth management institutions that wish to attract and support female 
clients, and to institutional regulators of financial advice provided to individual investors. 
Although behavioural finance theorists demonstrate how individual investors use their own 
intuitive beliefs and apply biases when making investment decisions for themselves 
(Kahneman 2003; Benartzi and Thaler 2001), much less attention has been given to whether 
financial advisors who aid millionaire investors may display similar biases when judging the 
needs and providing investment advice for male and female clients. Consequently, there is a 
need to explore how advisors understand and respond to the needs of male and female 
millionaire investors.  
By introducing a novel vignette based methodology to finance this study draws on 
attribution theory to explore if advisors perceive investors differently due to their gender, 
whilst holding  all other variables constant. Based on previous findings in the literature about 
differences between male and female investors, and previous attribution theory research, the 
expectation was that advisors would judge female vignettes (millionaire investors) to be less 
knowledgeable, to have less control over their investments, and to recommend lower risk 
portfolios to female relative to male vignettes. This study found that advisors did not rate the 
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investment knowledge of men and women differently, but that women millionaires were 
perceived to have less control over their investments.  
Contrary to the hypotheses, the results also show that advisors did not recommend 
lower risk portfolios to investors in the female compared to male vignettes. The perceived 
control findings in this study are in line with attribution research that has found that both 
male and female observers attribute female success to less controllable causes (Silvester and 
Koczwara 2012), and judge men as likely to have more control or confidence over their 
actions (Weiner et al. 1971). Investors who are judged to have less control over their 
investments might also be perceived to be more reliant on their advisors, and more likely to 
seek investment advice (Guiso and Japelli 2006; Karabulut 2010; Bluethgen, et al. 2008). 
Agnew et al. (2008), for example, report a link between self-perceived low financial literacy, 
confidence and lower risk aversion, results which were expected to be replicated when testing 
for the perception that advisors have of investors in this study.  However, results from the 
present study do not provide evidence of differences in the social perception that advisors 
have regarding the financial literacy of men and women, instead they demonstrate that 
advisors recommend portfolios with the same allocation to risky assets to equivalent male 
and female investors despite judging women to have less control over their investments. 
Yet, when controlling for gender of advisor, the results show that both the knowledge 
that advisors perceive investors in the vignettes to have and the portfolios that they 
recommend are significantly altered. Relative to male advisors, female advisors judge female 
vignettes to have less investment knowledge, but they also recommend less risky portfolios to 
female investors than to male investors. The control rating was also significantly lower for 
female investors when controlling for the gender of both advisors and investors.  
Whilst it may be problematic to generalise with a sample of 129 advisors from ten UK 
wealth management institutions (Berk 1983), it is particularly difficult for researchers to 
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access the community of advisors for millionaire investors. Indeed, the response rate for this 
voluntary survey was 38%, which is similar to the average of 35.7% cited by Baruch and 
Holtom (2008), suggesting a good level of engagement despite the absence of financial 
compensation. Likewise, as there are only forty UK institutions that individually manage 
over US$50 million (A.T. Kearney 2013), the sample is broadly representative of the wider 
population. Due to the anonymity of the survey data, information about the characteristics of 
non-respondents was not available for comparative analysis (Viswesvaran, Barrick, and Ones 
1993). While it is possible that this sample is not an exact representation of the advisory 
industry, and may be subject to sample selection bias (Berk 1983), we argue that it has high 
external validity due to its broad representation of a unique target population. Thus, while 
ratings were provided by respondents who were recruited in two different ways, splitting the 
sample into two subgroups for analysis purposes would have substantially reduced the 
sample size with effects on significance (Wheatley and Hills 2001) and hence the credibility 
of any subgroup effects (Sun et al. 2002). Similarly, while the proportion of women 
respondents in the total sample resembles that found in the advisory market as a whole (i.e., 
21% female advisors: Hannon 2014), sample A had only 8% female respondents. Advisors in 
sample A were also slightly younger and less experienced than those in sample B. 
Consequently, it was not possible with this data to explore meaningful sub-group differences.  
That said, the findings presented in this paper suggest that the gender of an advisor 
may be influential in investment recommendations, with the lowest mean ratings for 
knowledge, control and portfolio recommendation all given by female advisors for female 
vignettes. Interestingly, the highest ratings on these measures are provided by male 
respondents for male vignettes. These findings deserve further exploration in future research. 
Previous research has also found that an observer’s own risk tolerance may influence 
the risk rating they make for another person (Daruvala 2007). Therefore, future studies might 
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examine whether female advisors are less risk tolerant than their male peers, and thus more 
prone to recommend lower risk investments. Similarly, the level of self-rated knowledge of 
an advisor might influence the level of knowledge they attribute to others. However, it may 
also be the case that female advisors are simply more accurate in interpreting the extent to 
which their clients feel knowledgeable, confident, and averse to risk.  
According to classical theory we would not have expected a significant difference 
between the male and female investors. Yet based on previous findings of self-perceived 
lower financial literacy, confidence and risk tolerance among women, we expected that the 
judgements or social perception that advisors make of male and female investors would 
follow a similar pattern. The data source and findings presented in this paper provide unique 
new insights into advising millionaire individuals in a study with high face validity. Although 
varied, the results illustrate that advisors interpret the needs of female millionaire investors 
differently to male investors, and that the gender of the advisor significantly contributes to 
differences in that judgement. Although advisors exhibited less bias than expected, they 
judge female investors to have significantly less control over their investments. Such findings 
highlight the complex and subjective nature of how the needs of male and female millionaires 
are understood. Financial markets regulators, and the institutions that the advisors work for, 
may trust that advisors follow metrics, yet it seems that attributional bias may also contribute 
to the investment advice received by male and female investors; with the gender of the 
professional who provides the investment advice an important consideration. 
 
5.1 Practical Implications 
This study has significant implications as it addresses one of the problems faced by 
the wealth management industry: how to attract and encourage wealthy female clients to 
invest their wealth. A recent report shows that only 25% of affluent women in the US have an 
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advisor, and of this group 67% feel their advisor misunderstands their needs (Hewlett and 
Moffitt 2014). Moreover, women are generally less satisfied with their advisors, and more 
likely to perceive financial advising as a male orientated activity (Friedland 2013). Yet, 
despite significant growth in female wealth, women are less likely than men to have 
retirement savings (Hung and Yoong 2010) and less likely to have a high allocation to risky 
assets (Sundén and Surette 1998), which means that with a longer life expectancy than men, 
women  risk outliving their savings. Consistently lower risk investment portfolio 
recommendations to female investors result in underinvestment relative to both the market 
and their peers and a likelihood of lower risk-adjusted returns.  
It may of course also be problematic that the advisors in this study perceive women to 
be equally knowledgeable to men and to have less control over their investments but still 
recommend equally risky portfolios to women. This has potential consequences for the 
financial industry with regards to savings and retirement portfolios, and increases the scope 
for more tailored investment advice. These findings may also be of interest to financial 
regulators in relation to consideration of the fair treatment of consumers regardless of their 
gender, and the need to raise awareness among advisors of the effect that psychological 
heuristics can have on financial decision-making.  
 
5.2 Theoretical Implications 
Through introducing attribution theory to the finance field, the concept that social 
perceptions matter when investors make investment decisions jointly with an investment 
advisor, contributes to extant behavioural finance research. Such attributions and social 
perceptions that advisors make of millionaire investors are elicited through the employment 
of novel vignette based methodology with results that underpin previous findings in 
attribution theory where both male and female observers perceive female millionaire 
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investors to have less control over their investments. Attribution theory can therefore help to 
inform and expand existing behavioural finance theory by showing that social perception also 
matters when financial advisors judge the needs of millionaire investors, potentially 
influencing the investment advice provided and ultimately how the wealth is invested. 
Additionally, this study illustrates how the finance literature can benefit from the application 
of vignette methodology to elicit judgements in controlled experiments.  
 
5.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
There are several interesting areas for future research. The study can be replicated for 
less wealthy investors to explore if perceptions are different for another demographic. Future 
research could also consider geographical differences. Although out of scope in the current 
study, exploration of the correlation between advisor’s own risk tolerance and the risk 
perception of investors could add further insight and inform the findings presented in this 
paper. Increased understanding of other biases which result from agency conflicts, caused by 
mismatches between the agent’s and the principal’s own self-interests would also be 
beneficial. Such potential conflicts are important and may lead to advisors recommending 
riskier portfolios that attract higher incentives for the advisor. Additionally, millionaire 
investors may have several dedicated financial advisors, a complexity not considered in this 
study. Other studies might consider this as well as the depth and length of the relationship 
between the advisor and the investor. To advance knowledge about the interaction between 
financial advisors and investors future researchers may consider how the judgements that 
advisors make of investors match the expectation of investors. Perhaps a relative over-
reliance by female investors on advisors means that advisors have a higher level of influence 
over the investments they recommend to female investors which might in turn affect the 
allocation to risky assets, and a possible conflict of interest. One might argue for lower risk 
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portfolios to investors who display a higher level of dependence and lower level of 
confidence. Since this study concerns the study of judgements made by very experienced 
advisors, it may well be that this experience contributes to perceptual differences as 
experience, is negatively correlated with biases (Feng and Seasholes, 2005). Millionaires 
might also be judged differently than those who are less wealthy and advisors might attribute 
a higher risk tolerance to millionaires who can absorb a higher level of risk relative to those 
with less in investable wealth.  
 
6. Conclusion 
By introducing attribution theory to behavioural finance through the employment of 
an innovative vignette based study this paper examined whether advisors alter their judgment 
of the needs of millionaire investors depending on the client’s gender. With all other 
variables held constant, advisors were asked to rate the investment knowledge and the control 
that investors have over their investments, and to recommend one of seven investment 
portfolios with varied asset allocation (risk) to ten pen portraits (vignettes) of male and 
female investors. The study tested whether previous research findings, which indicate that 
female investors are less knowledgeable, less confident and less risk tolerant relative to male 
investors, hold in how millionaire investors are perceived by advisors. The results found that 
both male and female advisors rated female investors as having less control over their 
investments than male investors suggesting that women millionaires may be perceived as less 
confident and more reliant on advice by their investment advisors. However, advisors make 
the same judgements about the investment knowledge of men and women and make equally 
risky portfolio recommendations regardless of the gender of the investor. The findings add to 
extant behavioural finance literature in relation to the potential for bias and gender 
differences in client relationships by considering the impact of social cognition (i.e., 
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attribution theory) on the perceptions of investment advisors providing advice to millionaire 
investors. 
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Table 1. Example Vignettes 
                  
                     
(1) Susan (Michael), a 36-year old IT consultant, has done well in the London 
property boom. She (He) has generated liquid wealth of £800,000 in 
addition to a property portfolio worth £1.8 million net of mortgages. The 
portfolio generates about £105,000 bringing her (his) total yearly income to 
£180,000. Together with her (his) long-term partner she (he) is expecting a 
baby in 3 months. It is her (his) dream to resign from her (his) boring job in 
5 years to look after her (his) family. Her (his) partner has got bond and 
stock investments, but Susan (Michael) has always focused on property. 
However, she (he) realises that she (he) ought to diversify and is prepared to 
commit an initial £500,000. Susan (Michael) loves to travel and may buy a 
property abroad in the future. 
 
(2) Nick (Anna), 59, is the CEO of a FTSE250 company. You are aware that he 
(she) has about £1.5 million exposure to the company stock through 
incentive schemes. He (She) is paid £580,000 including bonuses per year, of 
which he (she) only spends half. It is very hard to get time in his (her) diary 
but he (she) is polite and forthcoming when you meet. He (She) has 
expressed an interest in bonds and asks you what alternative investments 
are. He (She) confesses to having panic-sold his (her) portfolio and lost a lot 
of money during the credit crisis. Nick (Anna) would like to hedge his (her) 
single stock exposure and invest an initial £1 million of his (her) £2.5 
million savings. He (She) is married and his (her) twins will be graduating 
from University this year. His (Her) wife (husband) would like him (her) to 
retire at 62 so that they can move to the Caribbean. 
 
       Notes: gender of the client in each vignette was varied as shown in ( ). 
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Table 2. Portfolio asset allocation composition 
      
 
          
 
        
 
Asset class Portf 1 Portf 2 Portf 3 Portf 4 Portf 5 Portf 6 Portf 7 
 
 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
 
UK Equities 11 19 27 35 37 40 42 
 
International Equities 8 11 14 18 28 38 44 
 
Bonds 51 45 39 32 20 7 3 
 
Cash 6 5 5 5 4 2 0 
 
Commercial Property 6 5 5 5 5 5 3 
 
Alternatives / Hedge funds 18 15 10 5 6 8 8 
 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
              
 
 Note: asset allocation of Portfolios 1 - 7 = Portf.  
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Table 3. Descriptives for respondents 
         
 
     Respondents N Age Experience 
 
Full Sample 
    All 129 41.74 12.78 
 Male 102 41.14 12.42 
 Female 27 44 14.15 
 
     Sample A 
    All 50 37.86 9.00 
 Male 46 38.04 10.70 
 Female 4 35.75 7.40 
 
     Sample B 
    All 79 44.19 14.27 
 Male 56 43.68 13.84 
 Female 23 45.43 15.30 
         
 
     Notes: Table 3 summarises the respondents used in the analysis.  
Initially the full sample, followed by separation of Samples A & B.  
Number of respondents, mean age and years’ experience. 
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Table 4. Summary results for vignette ratings by all 
respondents. 
                         
            
 
All vignettes 
 
Male Vignettes 
 
Female Vignettes 
Rating Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs 
            
Knowledge 5.68 2.20 1147 
 
5.76 2.19 572 
 
5.61 2.22 575 
Control  3.17 1.03 1147 
 
3.27 1.02 572 
 
3.08*** 1.02 575 
Rec. Portfolio 3.94 1.58 1147 
 
3.96 1.58 572 
 
3.91 1.58 575 
                        
Notes: (1) Based on responses of 129 respondents for all 10 vignettes with the number of observations (Obs) adjusted for 
missing data. *** Significant at 1% level. 
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Table 5. Knowledge ratings by gender of 
advisor and gender of vignette.  
                        
            
 
All Respondents 
 
Male Respondents 
 
Female Respondents 
Knowledge 
Rating Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs 
            All Vignettes 5.68 2.20 1147 
 
5.75 2.14 919 
 
5.41 2.41 228 
Male Vignettes 5.76 2.19 572 
 
5.79 2.16 458 
 
5.60 2.30 114 
Female Vignettes 5.61 2.22 575 
 
5.71 2.12 461 
 
5.22** 2.52 114 
                        
            Notes: Shows the differences for the knowledge rating controlling for the gender of both the vignettes and the 
respondents. Observations = Obs. ** Significance at 5% level. 
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Table 6. Control ratings for vignettes by gender 
of advisor and gender of vignette.  
                        
            
 
All Respondents 
 
Male Respondents 
 
Female Respondents 
Control Rating Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs 
            
All Vignettes 3.17 1.03 1147 
 
3.19 1.00 919 
 
3.12 1.11 228 
Male Vignettes 3.27 1.02 572 
 
3.27 1.02 458 
 
3.27 1.05 114 
Female Vignettes 3.08*** 1.0227 575 
 
3.11** 0.99 461 
 
2.96** 1.16 114 
                        
Notes: Shows the differences for the control rating controlling for the gender of both the vignettes and the respondents. Observations = 
Obs. *** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. 
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Table 7. Recommended portfolio rating by gender of 
advisor and gender of vignette.  
                        
            
 
All Respondents 
 
Male Respondents 
 
Female Respondents 
Portfolio Rating Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs 
            
All Vignettes 3.94 1.58 1147 
 
3.98 1.58 919 
 
3.75 1.56 228 
Male Vignettes 3.96 1.58 572 
 
3.99 1.60 458 
 
3.84 1.49 114 
Female Vignettes 3.91 1.58 575 
 
3.97 1.56 461 
 
3.67* 1.63 114 
          
  
      
  
    
Notes: Shows the differences for the recommended portfolio rating controlling for the gender of both the vignettes and the respondents.  
Observations = Obs. (3) * Significant at 10% level.  
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Figure 1. Conditional Density Function: Knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The density graph shows the difference in the distribution of the degree of knowledge, conditioning 
on gender of the financial advisors.  
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Figure 2. Conditional Density Function: Control.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The density graph shows the difference in the distribution of the degree of control, conditioning 
on gender of the financial advisors 
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Figure 3. Conditional Density Function: Recommended Portfolio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The density graph shows the difference in the distribution of the recommended portfolio, 
conditioning on gender of the financial advisors. 
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